


















MICROCON Research Working Paper 28 
Morten Bøås and Ingunn Bjørkhaug 
 

















Correct citation: Bøås, M. and Bjørkhaug, I., 2010. DDRed in Liberia: Youth 
Remarginalisation or Reintegration? MICROCON Research Working Paper 28, 
Brighton: MICROCON 
 
First published in 2010 
© Morten Bøås and Ingunn Bjørkhaug 2010 
ISBN 978 1 85864 936 6 
 
 
For further information, please contact: 
MICROCON: A Micro Level Analysis of Violent Conflict, Institute of Development 
Studies at the University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9RE 
Tel: +44 (0)1273 872891 
Email: info@microconflict.eu 





DDRed in Liberia: Youth Remarginalisation or Reintegration? 
 
Morten Bøås
1 and Ingunn Bjørkhaug
2 
 
MICROCON Research Working Paper 28 
 June 2010 
 
 
Abstract: This report questions mainstream approaches to the reintegration of youthful 
ex-combatants. In Liberia, the disarmament and demobilisation was implemented quite 
effectively, but several questions can be asked about the components of reintegration 
and rehabilitation in the DDR-process. Most ex-combatants are currently unemployed 
or underemployed as the programmes initiated first and foremost prepared them for jobs 
that did not exist. The programmes also worked from the assumption that wartime 
experiences, networks and command structures had to be broken down as they were 
seen as counterproductive to peace and reconciliation. Drawing on previous research in 
Liberia the hypothesis is that reintegration can better be achieved through peaceful 
remobilisation that allows the ex-combatants to make use of the skills, experiences and 
networks gained through the war. This is illustrated by the recent experience of a 
nightwatch patrol in Voinjama in Lofa County that was based on rank and command 
structure from the war which responded to local community demands and filled a 
security vacuum. This is an alternative path to reintegration that needs further analysis, 
and the article argued that this should be based on the premises of a genuine 
understanding of the background of Liberia’s young ex-combatants and the nature and 
form of their involvement in violent conflict. Many people were involved in the war, 
but most only fought for certain periods. The motivations for joining varied, but the 
collected data from our various studies shows that security considerations were among 
the most important factors. Most combatants were ordinary people who joined for the 
sake of protection for themselves, their families and their communities. DDR in Liberia, 
as elsewhere, is, however, built on the assumption that there is something particularly 
dangerous and marginalised about the group of people who constituted the rank-and-file 
of the factions involved in the war. This is, as we have seen, not necessarily the case. 
DDR is very much a reaction to the notion that these people are unattached to society, 
set apart in their own world, and therefore needs particular attention. The article will 
therefore suggests that DDR approaches are in dire need of a rethinking that links them 
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In the aftermath of the Liberian civil war almost 100,000 former combatants were 
demobilised through the Liberian Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and 
Rehabilitation Programme (LDDRRP). This programme is hailed as a success both by 
the United Nations' Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and other international stakeholders. 
However, whereas disarmament and demobilisation was implemented quite effectively, 
several questions can be asked about the components of reintegration and rehabilitation. 
Most ex-combatants are unemployed or underemployed as the programmes initiated not 
only prepared them for jobs that did not exist, but also worked from the assumption that 
wartime experiences, networks and command structures had to be broken down as they 
were seen as counterproductive to peace and reconciliation.  
  This is, however, not necessarily the case. Drawing on previous and ongoing 
research in Liberia, the aim of this report is to question mainstream approaches to the 
reintegration of youthful ex-combatants, asking whether this may be better achieved 
through peaceful remobilisation allowing ex-combatants to make use of the skills, 
experiences and networks gained during the war. This can, however, only be probed 
through a genuine understanding of the background of Liberia's young ex-combatants, 
and the nature and form of their involvement in violent conflict. Many people were 
involved in the war, but most only fought for certain periods and whereas the 
motivations for joining armed groups were many, systematic research on ex-combatants 
reveal that security considerations were among the most important factors. Most 
combatants were ordinary Liberians who joined for the sake of protection for 
themselves, their families and their communities (see Bøås and Hatløy 2008). 
      This report is based on two different fieldworks. One implemented in   
Voinjama, Lofa County in 2009, the other in Monrovia in 2005 at Duala Market and 
Red Light District.
3 The two studies will be referred to as the ‘Monrovia’ data set and 
the ‘Voinjama’ data set in this report. 
  The method for data collection consisted of a combination of Respondent-
Driven Sampling (RDS) and in-depth qualitative interviewing. RDS is a type of chain 
referral sampling that has been developed to identify hidden and elusive populations, 
but the method is also suitable for populations were no sampling frame exists 
                                                 
3 The fieldwork in Monrovia was conducted at two different sites in the town in order to achieve a good 
distribution of ex-combatants from different factions. This was not necessary in Voinjama, as the town is 




(Heckathorn 1997). This is the case for ex-combatants in Liberia. The Monrovia and the 
Voinjama samples consist of respectively 491 and 275 ex-combatants. 
 
Understanding Liberian ex-combatants 
The ordinary Liberian ex-combatants are usually seen as young person with a history of 
unemployment, underemployment and idleness (Dufka 2005; UN 2004; UNOWA 
2005), often based on a background as uprooted urban youths (Mkandawire 2002) or 
lumpen youths, prone to criminal behaviour and gross indiscipline (Abdullah 1998). 
The assumption behind the DDR-programme in Liberia was therefore that there is 
something particularly marginalised and violent about the pre-war lives of the young 
people who constituted the rank and file of the armed factions. The data collected in 
Monrovia, however, offered a different picture (see Bøås and Hatløy 2008) and the  
findings from the study in Voinjama supported this: the ex-combatants does not seem to 
have been any more idle, marginalised and alienated than any other group of young men 
in Liberia. Before they joined the insurgency they were never a world a part from their 
parents, relatives and local communities, but the majority were in fact living with them. 
Thus, suggesting that whereas one of the main objectives of DDR is to help reduce 
stigmatisation by means of programmes and processes to reintegrate former fighters, the 
programmes in Liberia may have had the opposite effect; by taking a group that was not 
particularly stigmatised and set them apart as an easily identifiable stereotyped group, 
marking them as something ‘other’ and problematic (see Jennings 2007).  
  Some reported that they were forced to join an armed group, but the findings in 
table 5 and 6 describes that, for the majority this was not the case. They made their 
decision based on the security predicament that they believed that they and their 
families were facing. Thus, suggesting that DDR approaches are in dire need of a 
rethinking that links them more directly to programmes aimed at social cohesion and 
societal security. Objectives more likely to be reached this report argues, if   
stakeholders work with rather than against the skills, networks and even the command 
structures acquired and established during the war. The road to reintegration and 
enhanced social cohesion and societal security can be better achieved through peaceful 
remobilisation of command structure than through first signposting a certain group 
(young rank and file ex-combatants) as particularly problematic for peace and stability 
and reconstituting their position as marginal by actively attempting to ‘destroy’ the 




irony is thus that current approaches to DDR may leave ex-combatants in a more 
vulnerable position of marginality when the end of the war is ‘written’ by those 
supervising the transition from war to peace that the DDR programmes should 
represents. 
  Before we turn to a discussion of our data, some brief clarification of mayor 
assumptions and concepts are necessary. First, an important assumption in the report is 
that, in societies undergoing conflict, armed groups can provide some sort of order and 
social organisation, and represent means for social integration and upward social 
mobility (see Utas 2003). In short, violence represents empowerment as well suffering 
and destruction. Although it is true that most of the combatants were poor and did not 
have a wide variety of options available, this is only an observation, not an explanation. 
It does not account for why many similarly situated young people did not join. 
Moreover, we argue that, just because people make choices under some level of 
coercion – not an uncommon occurrence in any society – this does not remove their 
agency and their ability to evaluate and act upon alternative coping strategies. The 
report is therefore built on the premise that people have agency, and they are not merely 
victims of circumstances and structures that they do not understand. It does not mean 
that they have an unlimited range of options they can choose from, but they are capable 
of acting within certain constraints and seize opportunities that are available to them. In 
this regard, the report is supported by Honwana's (2005, 2006) distinction between 
‘tactical’ and ‘strategic’ agency. The first is narrow and opportunistic, ‘exercised to 
cope with concrete, immediate concerns of their lives in order to maximise the 
circumstances created by their violent military environment’ (Honwana 2006: 71). The 
latter is based on a position of power that enables a certain degree of control over the 
self and the decisions taken. It is an agency of a longer timeframe, where events and 
action can be planned and are not only ‘determined by random factors they could 
neither predict or control’ (ibid.). 
  Carefully examining the conditions and concerns that initially led some people 
to join militias and participate in armed conflict, rather than simply assuming that force, 
poverty, greed, grievances were the only factors that were determinative, illuminate the 
distinction between tactical and strategic agency. By joining one or several armed 
groups, many ex-combatants seem to have made tactical decisions rooted in security 
concerns, and years after the conflicted ended their existence in post-war Liberia is to a 





Characteristics of the Liberian ex-combatant 
As Table 1 and Table 2 describes, the overall majority of the ex-combatants  are men. In 
Monrovia, 90 percent of the respondents were men, and in Voinjama the corresponding 
figure is 89 percent. This is as one might expect. Many more men than women 
participated in the different warring factions. Those women who did belong to a faction 
have mostly returned to their home communities without ever picking up the ‘tag’ as an 
ex-combatant. Among the women in the Monrovia, most claimed to have been involved 
only in supporting roles; e.g. ‘bush wives’, cocks, servants and porters. This is different  
in Voinjama as most of the women claim to have been fighters, some even in the role as 
commanders. In a qualitative interview one of the former female fighters were asked if 
she had cocked for combatants during her time with the rebel movement Liberians 
United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD). She boldly answered that ‘I never 
cocked; I had men preparing my food’. Women such as this one does not represent the 
majority of the female fighter, but her story is not only important, but also under-
researched. The inability of current approaches to DDR to even see these women as 
anything than passive victims may if fact leave them in a much more difficult and 
marginalised position than the one they inhabited prior to the conflict.  
  The excombatants is a young population even if there is at least six years since 
they were demobilised. In Monrovia, 64 percent of the combatants are less than 26 years 
of age, and only nine percent are above 34 years of age. The former combatants in 
Voinjama are also quite young, 58 percent were below the age of 26, and 25 percent 
below the age of 31.  
  As shown in table 1, one-third of the ex-combatants interviewed in Monrovia 
were born in Montserrado, whereas the ex-combatants born outside of Greater 
Monrovia mainly originates from the counties of Lofa (15 percent), Nimba 13 percent) 
and Bong 11 (Percent). In the Voinjama (see table 2), 82 percent were born and 
belonged to Lofa. Almost none of the ex-combatants in the two data sets were of 
foreign origin. This is quite surprisingly as it contradicts several reports from 
international NGOs who argues that there is a West African community of regional 
rebels who cross borders both to take part in wars and to benefit from DDR-
programmes (see Dufka 2005). The difference between the findings in this study and 
the reports from NGOs could be explained by two factors. Either they have already 




research has indicated. We cannot completely rule out the possibility that they have 
moved elsewhere or returned to their home of origin, but even in Lofa where many 
claimed that Guineans of Koninake origin fought for their ethnic cousins the Mandingo 
in LURD, most of the ex-combatants (of Mandingo as well as Loma origin) claimed 
that they were quite few and that their number had been increased by Taylor 
propaganda. The Liberian war was a national conflict and not a war of regional 




Table 1. Background of ex-combatants in Monrovia by interview site in percent 
      Red Light  Duala Market  All 
Sex Male  84  99  90 
   Female  16  1  10 
Age 10-17  8  12  10 
 18-25  46  66  54 
 26-33  33  18  27 
   34-52  13  4  9 
Place of origin (county) Montserrado  21  47  32 
 Lofa  21  7  15 
 Nimba  21  2  13 
 Bong  18  3  11 
 Sinoe  1  13  6 
 Grand  Bassa  5  3  4 
 Bomi  2  6  4 
  Grand Cape Mount  1  6  3 
 Maryland  3  2  3 
 Grand  Kru  1  4  2 
 River  Cass  3  2  2 
 Margibi  2  1  2 
 River  Gee  1  0  1 
 Gbarpolu  0  0  0 
 Grand  Gedeh  0  1  0 
 Abroad  0  1  1 
Religion Christian  92  86  90 
 Muslim  4  10  7 
   Other  4  4  4 
Ethnic group  Kpelle  27  12  20 
 Bassa  14  8  11 
 Gio  13  0  8 
 Kru  2  40  18 
 Grebo  5  5  5 
 Mano  9  1  6 
 Gola  0  5  2 
 Gbandi  6  2  4 
 Loma  16  2  10 
 Kissi  3  4  3 
 Vai  1  10  5 
   Other  4  10  7 







Table 2. Background of the ex-combatants in Voinjama 
      All 
Sex  Male 89 
   Female 11 
Age at time of interview  18-25 58 
  26-30 25 






Place of origin (county)  Lofa  82 
  Montserrado  8 
  Nimba  1 
  Bong  4 
  Grand Bassa  1 
  Bomi  1 
  Grand Cape Mount  1 
  Maryland  1 
  Sierra Leone  1 
  Margibi  1 
Religion Christian  39 
 Muslim  60 
   Other  1 
Ethnic Group  Mandingo/Mandika  53 
  Loma 19 
  Gbandi 12 
  Kissi 7 
  Kpelle 2 
  Other 5 
  No answer  1 
  Do not know  1 
 N     275 
 
 
Participation in the civil war 
As shown below in Table 3 and Table 4, the majority of the ex-combatants had either 
fought for LURD or Taylor's forces – the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) or 
other smaller militias allied to Taylor. Most of the ex-combatants at Duala Market had 
fought for LURD, whereas those in Red Light were mainly involved in Taylor's forces. 
In Voinjama, however, the overall majority had fought for LURD, and the remaining 











Table 3. First armed groups of whom they were member, in percent by interview site 
      Red Light  Duala Market  All 
Armed group (first)  NPFL  62  11  40 
 LURD  7  55  28 
 AFL  9  0  5 
 MODEL  2  3  2 
 ULIMO-K  3  1  2 
 ULIMO-J  0  2  1 
 GOL  and  other  17  28  22 
N   278  211  489 
 
Table 4. First group they fought for, in percent (Voinjama) 
LURD 81 
Taylor allies  19 
N 275 
 
For the observant reader, the ethnic composition of the ex-combatants from Duala 
Market with regard to their faction affiliation may seem surprising: LURD was mainly a 
Mandingo project, but many of the ex-combatants from the LURD-affiliated Duala 
Marked are of Kru origin (see Table 1). The answer to this puzzle lies in the 
combination of the logic of the war and the ethno-geographical stratification of the city 
of Monrovia.  
  The LURD rebellion (which dominated what may be called the second part of 
the Liberian civil war, from 1999 to 2003) emerged from Lofa County. Although the 
core fighting force of LURD was of Mandingo origin, this was not the case for all the 
combatants that took part in the final offensive against Monrovia in July and August 
2003. The explanation is therefore that the closer LURD came to the city centre, the 
more combatants the insurgency needed. Taylor's men fought desperately to prevent 
them from crossing into the town centre through the two main bridges at Providence 
Island, which LURD fought to control. It was therefore necessary to recruit more 
soldiers instantly, without any time for training, and, as this part of Monrovia is known 
as the Kru Town, quite a number of boys and men of Kru origin were recruited to fight 
for LURD. In the environment of extreme uncertainty that the conflict had created, for 
some the most sensible thing to do to protect themselves and their family was to join the 




Watch 2004). Most of the Mandingo people who fought for LURD, including female 
combatants, seem to have returned to Gbarpolu and Lofa after the civil war ended. 
Conversely, those who originated from the Monrovia and Montserrado area remained in 
their home communities. The  nature of the Monrovia-based recruitment into LURD 
was reiterated in interviews conducted by the author in November 2005 and May 2006 
in Mandingo towns along the Guinean border and in qualitative interviews during the 
fieldwork in Voinjama in May 2009. In conversations with former LURD fighters, they 
were asked about what they thought about their ‘brothers in arms’ who were still 
‘hanging around’ in Monrovia. Almost exclusively, they replied that these men were not 
true Mandingo warriors who had fought for a cause, but rather ‘hoodlums’ and 
‘nobodies’ who had been recruited because they were needed as manpower for the final 
offensive on Monrovia. 
It is not only of interest to know whom excombatants initially fought for, but 
also whether they changed sides during the cause of war. Surprisingly few combatants 
fought for more than one group. In Monrovia only nine percent fought with two groups, 
and less than one percent with three groups. Among the 47 persons who reported that 
they moved from one group to another 27 moved  from NPFL to LURD and other 
factions; while eight moved from LURD to other factions. In Voinjama almost no such 
movement between factions are recorded. This implies that is that much fewer 
combatants have switched between the armed factions than suggested by other reports 
(see Dufka 2005). Our data indicates that the young combatants who see war as an 
occupation – and therefore changed ‘employer’ when new economic opportunities (of 
looting and plundering) emerge – are relatively few. The ‘mercenary warrior’ problem 
argued by Human Rights Watch and other NGOs may exist, but this group seems to be 
smaller than envisioned. That said, the data also indicates (for example in a transfer 
from NPFL to LURD) that some people fought for a while, then returned to other, more 
peaceful activities, before yet again taking up arms.
4 This is in line with Ellis who 
observes that ‘there appears to have been a large number of people who took up arms at 
some stage of the war, but may have been victims at order times [...] . Even hard-core 
fighters seem to have remained attached to wider social communities’(1999: 133). 
                                                 
4 Between a transfers such as this, there is a considerable time lag. People cannot have moved directly 
from NPFL to LURD, simply because LURD was still not formed when NPFL was active as an armed 




Who they are 
As already stated, the majority of the ex-combatants claim that their main reasons for 
joining the insurgencies were security related: for their own protection and security, as 
well their families.  
Table 5. Reasons for joining the armed group in percent by first armed group 
(Monrovia)  
   NPFL  LURD  Other  All 
Feel  more  secure  53 36 46 46 
Keep  family  safe  47 24 34 36 
Kidnapped  or  forced  23 32 43 32 
Other  reasons  25 25 23 24 
Money  and  goods  17 27 22 21 
Revenge  15 7  13 12 
Wanted to fight  11  7  11  10 
Nothing else to do  11  10  7  10 
Each respondent could give three main reasons 
     
As Table 5 shows, security was the most important reason for joining among the 
population from Monrovia. This seems to be regardless of what armed faction they 
belonged to. However, as is also evident, the security motivation is somewhat stronger 
for those that joined NPFL that for those with LURD. This could be due the number of 
combatants who were involved with LURD for a short time during that insurgency's 
final offensive towards Monrovia in 2003. In addition to protect themselves, it is likely 
that many also joined for other and more opportunistic reasons, among others to make 
some money and obtain some goods.  
Table 6 Why former combatants joined the first armed group, in percent (Voinjama) 
All 
Why did you join the first armed group?  To feel more secure  14 
I thought it would keep my family safe  13 
 
To feel more powerful and important  2 
I wanted to fight  1 
To gain access to money  4 
I had nothing else to do  5 
I believed in the cause the group fought for  3 
I wanted to join friends or family in the group  6 
My family encouraged me to fight  2 
I wanted to take revenge against other groups  17 
I was kidnapped or forced  32 





The reasons for getting involved in Voinjama are similar to the answers reported in 
Monrovia. Table 6 shows that joining an insurgency due to security-related factors was 
a strong motivation factor among the ex-combatants. In both data sets, 32 percent 
reported that they had been kidnapped or forced. Abductions and forced recruitment 
were practised by all armed factions during the civil war in Liberia, but contrary to 
some NGO reporting, a high number of combatants also recruited themselves 
voluntarily into thearmed group. It is every reason to believe that the figures reported 
here are more accurate than claims, often based on assumptions, that almost all fighters 
were forcibly recruited. The majority of ex-combatants were ordinary people who 
joined armed groups based on various reasons concerning protection and opportunity.  
  Their ‘ordinariness’ of the ex-combatants is also illustrated by whom they lived 
with prior to the war. These ex-combatants were never the ‘loose molecules’ of society: 
a hyper-mobile community of ‘lumpens’ hardwired to criminality and idleness, but a 
group of ordinary Liberian youth who mainly lived and lives with parents or close 
relatives. The majority of the former combatants in Monrovia and Voinjama had been 
enrolled in school and conducted some work (see table 7, 8, 9 and 10). It was only the 
minority who were unemployed in search for work.   
Table 7. Who the ex-combatants are living together with now by whom they were living 
with before in percent (Monrovia) 
     Lived with before    

















No  one  6 2 7 1  3 
Parents 10  39  5  21  30 
Close  relatives 26 37 57 30  37 
Others  58 22 31 48  30 
  N    31 314  58 87  490 
Table 8. Current activity by activity before they joined the armed forces in percent 
(Monrovia) 
     Activity before joining armed group    


















School  15 57 23 20 41 
Work  and  school  3 3 4 4 3 
Work  29  7 8 7 12 
Unemployed looking for work  23  18  23  35  22 
Unemployed not looking for work  30  15  42  35  22 





Before they joined an armed group, the majority of the ex-combatants in Monrovia went 
to school (60 percent) and almost 25 percent were working. Often idleness has been 
claimed as one of the main reasons for young people to join armed groups (see UN 
2004). However, most of the ex-combatants hanging around in Red Light and Duala 
Market had something to do before they joined an armed group. The same results are 
also evident in the data from Voinjama. 
Table 9. Duties and whom they were living with before joining an armed group, in 
percent (Voinjama) 
   All 
Duties six months  before joining the first armed group  Work  17 
 School  63 
 Housework  13 
 Nothing  6 
 Other  4 
Lived with before they joined the first armed group  Parents/ Close relatives  84 
 Alone  8 
 With  spouse/children  5 
   Friends  3 
N     275 
 
Table 10. Living with after participated in armed group, in percent* (Voinjama) 
Spouse/own children  25 
Parents or other relatives  52 
Friends/ex-combatants 25 
N 275 
*multiple responses possible, total percentages may exceed 100 percent 
 
They went to school (63 percent) or worked (17 percent), and very few, only six 
percent, claimed that they had nothing to do, The majority lived with parents or other 
close relatives. After the war, the majority either settled down with their spouse and 
children or continued to live with their families. There is a subsection of 25 percent who 
now live together with friends made during the war, however none reported to live 
alone contrary to eight percent prior to their engagement in the civil war. To share a 
house with some friends was a much more affordable solution and some of the former 
combatants reported that they preferred to share a house/room with friends they trusted. 
  The most important thing to take note of, however, is that there is little in these 




most other young people in Liberia. They went to school, worked and lived with either 
their parents or other close relatives. The ex-combatants background is therefore 
remarkably normal. It is, however, also important to keep in mind that pre-war Liberia 
was a country where exclusion and marginalisation were the normal conditions for most 
people. Most people were generally poor, disenfranchised, and without any access to or 
hope for upward social mobility (see Ellis 1999). The civil war that started on Christmas 
Eve 1989 did not improve people's living condition. For the majority, it only made them 
worse and less predictable.  
There is also nothing in the datasets that indicates that they are ex-
communicated from their families and local communities. The majority still lives with 
their parents or with close relatives. This indicates that their families and local 
communities recognise that people mainly started fighting in order to provide for their 
own, their family's and their community's security. Their original reason for 
involvement in the war was neither very political, nor overwhelmingly based on a desire 
for personal enrichment or due to idleness, but in order to improve their security 
situation. Their motivations for fighting may or may not have changed as the war 
continued, but the very fact that most of them still live with their relatives in their local 
communities suggest that their wartime experience has not turned these against them. 
Nevertheless, the DDR interventions has almost exclusively been based on the 
assumption that wartime experiences networks and command structures must be broken 
down as they would be counterproductive to peace and reconciliation. This is, as the 
following small case study from Voinjama illustrates not necessarily the case. 
 
Reintegration through remobilisation: the night watch in Voinjama 
After the end of the war and the termination of the DDR-programme, the ex-combatants 
in Voinjama (as elsewhere in Liberia) returned to the same life as the one they had lived 
prior to the war: a life of poverty, marginalisation and few if any potential for upward 
social mobility (for example 44 percent of the informants in Monrovia are unemployed; 
that is, with one exception: they were not ordinary Liberian youths anymore as they had 
assumed the status of ex-combatants. The job training and skills training that the DDR-
programme had given them were of little use in their quest for employment, and their 
wartime experience was only defined in negative terms. This was also the case in 
Voinjama where many ex-combatants claimed that they felt useless and seen as 




the war ended. They ended up precisely as poor as they were when the war started, the 
only difference was that they after the war also were singled out as a security threat, 
making their aspirations of work, progress and upward social mobility even harder to 
achieve. This was their life-world situation in Voinjama until new local security 
dynamics lead to a demand for the skills, networks and command structures that the ex-
combatants acquired during the war. 
  After the war ended in August 2003, some sort of peace and stability returned to 
Voinjama in 2004, and the period until the end of 2007 was quite calm. However, in the 
early part of 2008, the city of Voinjama and the surrounding areas witness a sharp 
increase of criminality and uncertainty. Drugs were prevalent and armed robberies 
happened almost everyday. The Pakistani troops that constituted the local UNMIL 
attachment could not do very much, the local Liberian police not only lacked manpower 
and resources, but was also seen as corrupt, and a local judiciary system did not exist. In 
addition, rumours also started circulating that ‘Hardman’, a notorious expert in ritual 
killings were about to relocate from Gbargna to Voinjama and make this area the centre 
of his operations.
 5 Thus, feeling increasingly under threat, local people and the business 
community, Loma and Mandingo alike turned to the only people they believed could 
provide security, the faction leaders from the war that still had command structure 
authority.  
  The one they turned to was ‘Master General’, a quite respected, but also much 
feared LURD leader during the war. Master General quickly seized the initiative and 
reactivated his command structures from the war (e.g. LURD), but also included some 
of his former enemies; that is people who had fought for Taylor or local Taylor-allied 
Loma militias. The product was an effective neighbourhood militia that acted as a night 
watch patrolling the streets of Voinjama every night from midnight to five am in the 
morning established. Master General was the ‘commander’, but the nigh watch was also 
given a civilian superstructure in the form of a committee consisting of a chairman (a 
Mandingo youth leader), a co-chairman (a rich Loma farmer) and a secretary (an 
educated Mandingo youth leader). This committee kept records of suspected criminals 
apprehended, before they were either handed over to the police or just chased out of the 
town and the area, and administered the revenue collection needed to maintain the night 
                                                 
5 ‘Hardman’ is not a mythical figure. He exists, but whether he in fact is a ‘specialist’ in ritual killings and 
planned to relocate himself to Voinjama is not important. People act on perceptions, and it is therefore the 




watch. Each household contributed 20 Liberian dollars per week, whereas shop owners 
paid 50 Liberian dollars per week for each shop or market stall that they owned.  
  In the months that this ‘experiment’ in local security provision lasted (basically 
to the end of 2008) crime dropped remarkably. The ex-combatants not only felt useful, 
but also were seen as valuable community members and not a latent security threat, and 
earned some money as well. Thus, what this case suggest is not only that peaceful 
remobilisation such as this through latent command structures can facilitate 
reintegration, but also create even state-like security systems that can fill a void that the 
Liberian state and its international partners had ignored. The night watch not only 
provided security, it also administered justice and collected revenue to maintain this 
system in a legitimate manner. When the system was dismantled it was simply because 
it was not seen as needed anymore, but the committee continues to meet to screen the 
security situation and discussions concerning the permanent re-establishment of the 
night watch continues. All of this happened and continues to happen without much 
involvement of the Liberian state and the UN and other international agencies, 
suggesting that the latter seem to stick to the assumption that the ex-combatants 
constitutes a particular difficult and dangerous segment of the Liberian population. The 
local community, however, saw them as what they really are ordinary youths who ended 
up fighting due to the specific circumstances of the Liberian civil war. 
 
Some concluding thoughts 
The DDR program in Liberia, as elsewhere, is built on the assumption that there is 
something particularly dangerous and marginalised about the group of people who 
constituted the rank-and-file of the factions involved in the war. This is, as we have 
seen, not necessarily the case. DDR is very much a reaction to the notion that these 
people are unattached to society, set apart in their own world, and therefore needs 
particular attention. This is not the case in Liberia, and the DDR-programme may 
therefore have had the opposite effect.   
  This suggests that DDR approaches are in dire need of a rethinking that links 
them more directly to programmes aimed at social cohesion and societal security. In this 
regard, DDR can still play an important role as an official signpost for general 
demobilisation and disarmament, the first step towards an improved security situation, 
and a change from ‘tactical’ to ‘strategic’ agency. This has, however, not been the case 




the ‘tactical’ to the ‘strategic’ aspect of agency only started when peaceful 
remobilisation occurred to serve a local demand for security. Re-examining security 
considerations can therefore help us understand these challenges, as well as illustrating 
the importance of basing post-conflict programmes such as DDR on knowledge derived 
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